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THE THEORETICAL CONSTITUTIONAL SHAPE (AND SHAPING)
OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST*
ABSTRACT
In order to fathom the theoretical shape of the American national security
constitutional system, and to appreciate how that system should be shaped in
the future, it is vital to conceptualize the legal field of American national
security law as the interaction of four constitutive dimensions. Initially the
factual context involves two overarching general concerns: first, the
maintenance of the Nation’s strategic advantage over challengers,
competitors, and threats to America’s future; and second, the remarkable
strategic responsibility of presidents of the United States to deftly shift from
one serious, potentially catastrophic, crisis to the next. The second dimension
is the policy trade-offs of American national security law between calculated
permutations of liberty, on the one hand, and security, on the other hand. The
third dimension of the field entails the threefold characteristics of the values
and interests of American national security law—preserving the American
nation and its rule of law, protecting the American people and homeland, and
defending America’s allies and friends from unauthorized violence and natural
catastrophes that might destabilize America’s strategic advantage. The final
dimension of the field entails the legal doctrine of the primacy of the president
to fashion national security presiprudence within broad constitutional
executive powers, subject to reasonably deferential judicial review.
Form and function in the American national security legal system is best
understood as flowing from presidential decision and discretion. Three
overarching philosophical problems of judicial review of the president’s
national security decision-making entail the problem of knowledge, the
problem of conduct, and the problem of governance. In turn, to flesh out and
better understand these problems in concrete cases, the Supreme Court must
be cognizant of the various aesthetics of national security law and the multiple

* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. University of Pennsylvania (Wharton
School), 1973; J.D. Cornell University, 1977. I am grateful for the helpful comments I received
in response to an earlier version of this Article at the April 2009 Conference, International Law in
the Domestic Context, held at Valparaiso University. My thanks go to Pierre Schlag, Robert
Summers, and Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
439

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

440

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX:439

potential types of national security arguments. In resolving problems of
American national security law, the Court should refrain from citing foreign
judicial precedent and should rely exclusively on American law and precedent
for four functional reasons: (1) ethos and American identity, (2) effective
dispute resolution, (3) meaningful agenda-setting and constitutional dialogue,
and (4) judicial political legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Court should be
cautiously open to non-precedential learning of transnational ideas regarding
national security issues.
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I. PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL CONCERNS
What is the nature of the American national security constitutional
system?1 Given the special American constitutional role of the president as
national security sentinel and the uniquely nationalistic praxis of
counterterrorism law, what are the key, overarching philosophical problems of
judicial review of the president’s national security legal work product (what we
may call national security presiprudence)?2 In approaching the daunting task
of reviewing American national security law, how should Supreme Court
Justices and other federal judges envision the shape, or aesthetics, of the field?
What are the various types of legal arguments that are instrumental in shaping
American national security law? What role, if any, should foreign judicial
precedents play in shaping American national security law?
This Article addresses these questions, both generally and by specific
examination of the field of American national security law.3 Angst among
American jurists and legal commentators about the legitimacy,4 method,5
1. In general, the field of national security law is only a few decades old. See NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW xxxvii (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005). A broad
definition of the field involves “a full synergy of international law, international relations, and
national law and policy related to the security of the [United States as a nation] and the problem
of unauthorized violence in the world.” Id. The constitutional conundrum of American national
security law draws its purpose from the famous dictum: “[T]he Constitution, considered only for
its affirmative grants of power capable of affecting [foreign affairs], is an invitation to struggle
for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787–1957, at 171 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. Cf. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal
Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 229 (2010) (arguing that the “explanatory power” of a legal
field depends on “the extent to which situations that arise within the field exhibit a recognizable
pattern”; “the simplicity of the pattern”; “the extent to which the pattern predominates within the
field”; “the extent to which a single pattern explains the various issues that arise within the field”;
and, “the scope of situations that arise within the field”).
4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 347–48 (2008). On one hand, there is a
category of American judicial citation of foreign court decisions that is “unexceptionable,” and
legitimate, consisting of persuasive legal arguments about a vexing subject like abortion; use of
foreign law in a contract that specified that the agreement should be interpreted according to the
substantive law of another country; reference to international law that is discussed in foreign
judicial decisions when the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute authorizes a federal court to
enforce criminal or tort claims based on international law violations; and old English decisions
used to establish the original meaning of a phrase from the American Constitution. Cf. id at 348.
On the other hand, American judicial citation of a foreign decision “cited for its precedential
effect” by American judges, “searching for a global consensus on an issue of U.S. constitutional
law” is problematic. Concerns of legitimacy in American judges citing foreign judicial decisions
as precedent include the usurpative imposition of “cosmopolitan values . . . in the name of our
eighteenth-century Constitution . . . .”, and the “undemocratic” extraction of foreign precedent
and its injection into the American constitutional system. Id. at 352, 353. See also Cheryl
Saunders, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?, 59 CURRENT
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transparency,6 and context of citation of foreign case law7 in American
constitutional adjudication provides a useful foil8 for describing the shape of

LEGAL PROBS. 2006 91, 108, 126 (2007) (pointing out that while citation to foreign law in
constitutional adjudication of countries such as Australia, Canada, Israel, South Africa, and the
United Kingdom raise no legitimacy concerns because of these nations’ constitutional systems
and national self-conceptions, legitimacy is an issue when American judges cite foreign law by
virtue of the logic of the American judicial appointment process, which draws its force from the
democratic legitimacy of the elected president and Senate).
5. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 349–52. Methodological objections of American judicial
citation of foreign judicial precedent include “the promiscuous opportunities that such a practice .
. . opens up”; the “wasteful ‘arms race’ character” of the practice where, “[i]f one [American]
judge starts citing such [foreign] sources, opposing judges are placed under pressure to go
digging in the same sources for offsetting citations”; the illusion that “the world’s judges
constitute a single community of wisdom and conscience”; and the arrogance and usurpation by
“sophisticated cosmopolitans” wearing judicial robes, who misguidingly try to “impose their
cosmopolitan values on Americans in the name of our eighteenth-century Constitution.” Id.; see
also Saunders, supra note 4, at 99–100 (analyzing the sophisticated methodological issues in
citation to foreign sources of law that are underappreciated or under-theorized including whether
the foreign legal citation involves a “conclusion of law, a constitutional or legal norm” or “an
argument, a value, a perception, an interpretative approach, or merely a happy turn of phrase”; the
various potential stages in a court’s reasoning process when citation to “foreign experience” takes
place, for example, “to frame the question,” or “to identify options or more generally to survey
the field,” or “to test a hypothesis,” or, “to confirm a conclusion,” or “to explore the
consequences of a particular result”).
6. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 350. Citation of foreign judicial decisions by American
judges is really just “one more form of judicial fig-leafing” whereby judges—”timid about
speaking in their own voices lest they make legal justice seem too personal”—seek to “further
mystify the adjudicative process” and to obscure the real bases for politically-charged
constitutional cases that derive from “their personal experiences, values, intuitions, temperament,
reading of public opinion, and ideology.” Id.
7. See id. at 351–53, 366 (arguing that “foreign [judicial] decisions emerge from a complex
social, political, historical, and institutional background of which most [American] judges and
[j]ustices are ignorant”; foreign constitutional courts often have incentives to issue “audaciously
progressive opinions” because the foreign judges know their constitutional rulings can be
nullified by a legislative supermajority vote, while overruling a constitutional ruling by the
Supreme Court of the United States requires the arduous amendment process of ratification by
three-fourths of the states and two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress; and foreign judicial
decisions are often aggressively interventionist policy determinations based on foreign legal
systems “alien to our own system” and antithetical to the American historical experience); see
also Saunders, supra note 4, at 126 (pointing out a “range” of contextual “reasons why references
to foreign law in constitutional cases might begin to attract closer, and not necessarily friendly,
scrutiny” including “the impact of the new emphasis on differences in comparative private law;
the growing nationalism that is a sign of the times, whether as a reaction against increasingly
heterogeneous communities, threats of terrorism or globalization; and the mounting hostility to
judicial activism”).
8. Indeed, much has been written in recent years about the appropriateness, circumstances
and methodology of American courts (particularly the Supreme Court of the United States) citing
foreign law or international law in the course of constitutional and other types of adjudication.
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American national security law and the forces that should and should not shape
this field of law in the future. American national security law is saturated by
diverse and profound questions of constitutional interpretation. Since
September 11th and the commencement of the American wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan a few years ago, there has been a “frenetic pace of developments”
in American national security law that is likely to continue into the foreseeable
future.9 The flavor of this torrent trend in the field of national security law is
captured by the preface of a recent combined supplement to two law books that
highlights the following novel developments:
[N]ew information about the rationale for the war in Iraq, a second decision
from the FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Court of Review . . . ,
and the latest in a remarkable series of rulings on national security letters . . . .
Also included . . . [is] a new Second Circuit decision on the extra-territorial
application of the [Fourth] Amendment . . . , the Supreme Court’s decision in a
suit for damages alleging mistreatment of a terrorism suspect in custody . . .
and a dramatic post-Boumediene decision concerning the reach of the writ of
habeas corpus to Afghanistan . . . . The election of a new President has,
predictably, brought a number of changes as well, and many of those are

See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory of Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 639 (2005); James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 133 (2008); James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost?
Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2006); Stephen Breyer &
Antonin Scalia, A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The Relevance of Foreign
Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia
and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective on
Constitutional Adjudication, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Harold
Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); Ken I. Kersch,
The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U.
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 345 (2005); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV.
652 (2005); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007); Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use
of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, (2005); Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2007); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing
More? Unpacking the Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1275 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Demominator Problem, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 148 (2005).
9. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (4th ed.) & COUNTERTERRORISM LAW (Stephen Dycus
et al. eds., Supp. 2009).
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reflected here in executive orders, speeches, and materials from the Justice
10
Department.

As an opening theoretical gambit, in expansive and synoptical theoretical
terms, “[w]e can conceptualize a legal field as the interaction of four
underlying constitutive dimensions of the field: (1) a factual context that gives
rise to (2) certain policy trade-offs, which are in turn resolved by (3) the
application of values and interests to produce (4) legal doctrine.”11 The factual
context of American national security law problems involves two overarching
general concerns: first, the maintenance of the Nation’s strategic advantage
over challengers, competitors, and threats to America’s future;12 and second,
the remarkable strategic responsibility of presidents of the United States to
deftly shift from one serious, potentially catastrophic, crisis to the next.13 The
policy trade-offs of American national security law encompass calculated
permutations between liberty, on the one hand, and security, on the other hand.
The values and interests of American national security law are threefold:
preserving the American nation and its rule of law, protecting the American
people and homeland, and defending America’s allies and friends from
unauthorized human violence and natural catastrophes that might destabilize
America’s global strategic advantage. Finally, the overarching legal doctrine
of the field of American national security law is the primacy of the president to

10. Id. at ix. “We expect the frenetic pace of developments to continue for the foreseeable
future, with two wars still underway, looming threats in Iran and North Korea, a flood of national
security-related litigation working its way through the court system, and the articulation of new
policies by the Obama administration.” Id. at x.
11. Aagaard, supra note 3, at 225.
12. See BRUCE BERKOWITZ, STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE: CHALLENGERS, COMPETITORS AND
THREATS TO AMERICA’S FUTURE (2008).
13. See Robert F. Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 881, 887 & n.34 (2010) [hereinafter Blomquist,
Jurisprudence].
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fashion national security presiprudence within broad constitutional executive
powers, subject to reasonably deferential judicial review of facts and law.14

14. Cf. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009)
(arguing that national security fact deference by the judiciary should not entail a “one-size-fits-all
solution”). Thus, a nuanced and balanced view of national security fact deference—closely
intertwined with the precise legal issue involved in a particular case—leads to the following “key
insights”:
 Comparative institutional accuracy arguments can favor the executive branch, but judges
cannot assume that this is so simply because a factual dispute has national security
connotations.
 Comparative accuracy can be a function of superior access to information or expertise,
but in any event deference is not appropriate on this ground absent a showing that the
decision actually exploited such advantages in a reliable manner.
 Judges should not be too quick to assume that executive agencies hold an advantage
over the judiciary with respect to information access; the possibility that information can
be passed through to the judge, combined with the potential for new information to
emerge in the adversarial process, render this inquiry unmanageable in many if not most
instances.
 Special expertise [of the executive branch] is more likely to matter in the context of
predictive judgments—which at times shade into opinion or policy judgment—than in
the context of retrospective factfinding.
 Cognitive biases are significant concerns for any factfinding process, but it is unclear
that judges are in a position to detect their presence. In any event, predicating deference
on a showing that the executive reliably employed epistemic advantage may guard
indirectly against such concerns, via the third party accountability effect.
 Weighted accuracy concerns driven by the magnitude of the litigants’ interests (the
government’s national security concerns, for example, or a private person’s fundamental
rights) are likely to be a wash in this setting, in which case it makes more sense to
prioritize core accuracy and other prudential concerns.
 Efficiency concerns relating to speed, agenda control, and resource consumption
ordinarily should have no impact on the fact deference question, however important they
may be in other contexts.
 Prudential concerns regarding the collateral consequences of non-deferential review,
including the risk of disrupting military operations or exposing classified information,
are legitimate concerns, but they are better addressed through procedural devices such as
the state secrets privilege.
 The fact that a national security related claim is justifiable does not mean that
institutional self-preservation concerns drop out of the picture; fact deference provides a
tempting—and not very transparent—opportunity for a judge to accommodate such
prudential concerns.
 Democratic accountability concerns are weak with respect to retrospective factfinding,
but they can be strong with respect to predictive judgments—particularly where the
latter involves elements of opinion or policy judgment.
 Legitimacy concerns, understood as claims of formal allocation of authority to the
executive branch, do no independent work in this context; on close inspection legitimacy
arguments collapse into one another of the functional and prudential concerns described
above.
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The relationship among these broad components of the field of American
national security law can be illustrated by a conceptual diagram:15
FIGURE 1:
CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW

On a second preliminary theoretical level, we should be cognizant of the
experimentation and innovation, within the domain of American law, that has
transpired during the first decade of the twenty-first century by American
lawyers, executive branch officials, and judges in processing difficult cases
that have emerged in the field of American national security law—a trend that
is likely to continue in the future. As noted by Professors Chesney and
Goldsmith, by way of an important illustration of American national security
law experimentation and innovation, the models of criminal justice versus the
military detention approach for responding to terrorists have been
converging.16 As they explain: “During [recent] years, the military detention
system has instituted new rights and procedures designed to prevent erroneous
detentions, and some [American] courts have urged detention criteria more
oriented toward individual conduct than was traditionally the case.”17 But

Id. at 1432–33. But see, RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS,
HALTING STEPS 173 (2007) (“[V]ery few judges other than the handful assigned to the two
foreign intelligence courts have security clearances, or . . . know anything about national security,
including the scope and gravity of the terrorist threat and the best methods of combating it.”).
15. I am indebted to Todd S. Aagaard for the inspiration of this conceptual diagram which
he applied to the field of environmental law. Aagaard, supra note 3, at 279.
16. Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1080–1081 (2008).
17. Id. at 1081.
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interestingly, “the criminal justice system has diminished some traditional
procedural safeguards in terrorism trials and has quietly established the
capacity for convicting terrorists based on criteria that come close to
associational status.”18 While “neither model as currently configured” presents
a final answer to “the problem of terrorist detention,”19 the trend of
convergence “does identify areas of [American] consensus about detention
criteria and procedural safeguards and highlights the outstanding issues that
any serious detention reform must face.”20 Given the silence of what particular
international treaty-based detention criteria apply to non-international armed
conflicts (NIACs)—the type of conflict epitomized by terrorist attacks on
Americans in the last decade or so—detention criteria have properly been
subject to discretionary experimentation and innovation by American legal
officials.21
A third preliminary theoretical matter involves the nature and limits of
“constitutional borrowing”22 of ideas from foreign legal sources in the
development of the field of American national security law. “[C]onstitutional
borrowing is the practice of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other
legal elements from one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive
ends.”23 One facet of constitutional borrowing is “cross-border appropriation
of ideas, and often within a single area of constitutional law.”24 In the field of
American national security law there exists a vexing question of “fit”25—

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1086–87. Cf. Michael Chertoff, The Responsibility to Contain: Protecting
Sovereignty Under International Law, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 130, 130–32 (2009) (arguing against the
subordination of “established U.S. laws and even U.S. constitutional provisions” to “international
legal mandates and ‘customary’ international law—in which ‘custom’ is not traditionally
interpreted, as being on the actual practices of states, but instead is dictated by the policy
preferences of foreign judges or, worse yet, international scholars and academics”; arguing for the
eventual creation of a “modern international legal order” entailing “individual states assum[ing]
reciprocal obligations to contain transnational threats emerging from within their borders so as to
prevent them from infringing on the peace and safety of fellow states around the world”; but the
new international legal framework “will be successful only if sovereign consent of individual
nations,” in international treaties or conventions, “remains the bedrock of international law and
only if” the trend is resisted by the United States to have “broad and abstract norms through
undemocratic means” imposed on its development of national security law).
22. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459
(2010).
23. Id. at 461 (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 467 n.15. Indeed, while cross-border constitutional borrowing is only one type of
constitutional borrowing, since “all manner of legal appropriations, both between different legal
systems and within . . . a single political order” are possible, id. at 467, cross-border constitutional
borrowing is probably the most controversial to Americans.
25. Id. at 495–99.
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”[h]ow well different bodies of constitutional knowledge fit together”26—
because “the rule of law requires that material taken across boundaries bear a
defensible relationship to existing cultural practices and political
Moreover, there is also a troublesome issue of
commitments.”27
“transparency”28 in cross-border constitutional borrowing in the field of
American national security law when foreign precedents might be covertly
cited without “revealing [their] genesis or evolution,”29 without a nuanced
discussion of their “pedigree,”30 and without a “painstakingly”31 thorough
discussion of context.32
The remaining portions of this Article proceed as follows: In Part II,
attention is first focused on the form and function of the American national
security system and the systematizing device of American national security
presiprudence. Then, I delineate key philosophical problems facing the
American judiciary in reviewing national security presiprudence (the problem
of conduct, the problem of knowledge, and the problem of governance). This
analysis is followed by a discussion of the four aesthetics of American national
security law (grid, energy, perspectivist, and disassociative) that are explained
and elaborated in relation to five types of potential national security legal
arguments (text, intent, precedent, tradition, and policy). Part III of the Article
applies the concepts that are fleshed out in Part II to the specific question of
whether and how American judges should use foreign judicial precedent in
reviewing presidential national security law decisions—if you will, a
dimension of the jurisprudence of American national security presiprudence.
II. FORM AND FUNCTION IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY LEGAL
SYSTEM
A.

American National Security Presiprudence

As the early twentieth-century jurisprude, Rudolf von Jhering, once
remarked: “Form is rooted in the innermost essence of law.”33 Taking

26. Id. at 495.
27. Id. at 497.
28. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 22, at 499.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Cf. Michael Kirby, The Common Law and International Law—A Dynamic
Contemporary Dialogue, 30 LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010) (discussing the fit and transparency of
constitutional borrowing in countries like South Africa, India, and Canada, where constitutional
provisions have stimulated the change, and in commonwealth countries like Australia, where a
framework or tradition of constitutional borrowing is extant).
33. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL STUDY 3
(2006) (footnote omitted).
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inspiration from this abstract observation, Professor Robert S. Summers
introduced his book-length study of legal form by arguing:
Many leading scholars and theorists of law in the twentieth century including
H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen, viewed a legal system as essentially a system of
rules. In developed Western societies, however, a legal system is far more
than this. It is made up of diverse functional units only one major variety of
which consists of rules. These diverse units are, in turn, duly organized in
complex ways to form a system. To grasp the nature of a legal system, it is
first necessary to understand the diverse functional units of the system. These
include institutions, such as legislatures and courts [and executives], legal
precepts such as rules and principles, nonpreceptual species of law such as
contracts and property interests, interpretive and other legal methodologies,
sanctions and remedies and more. A discrete legal unit does not function
34
independently. It must be combined and integrated with other units.

Summers goes on to theoretically describe “the overall form of a legal
system as whole” as “a highly complex purposive systematic arrangement
designed to govern in accord with law a population typically residing in a
He asserts the importance of
geographically contiguous area.”35
“systematizing devices” of a robust legal system that include, among others,
the following: “the centralization and hierarchical ordering of legislatures,
courts, administrative bodies and other entities operating within their own
jurisdictional spheres”;36 “specification of systematic priorital relations as
between first-level legislative, judicial, administrative and other jurisdictional
spheres . . . specifying how general types of conflicts between otherwise valid
rules, between other law, and between officials and their actions are to be
resolved”;37 “codification, consolidation, or other continuing systematization
of first-level rules and other law, into one field after another, into coherently
ordered bodies of law”;38 and “adoption of uniform interpretive . . . and other
first-level methodologies”39 to create coherence and hierarchically-ordered
institutional arrangements.40
Energized by Professor Summers’ overarching systematic legal theory, I
developed an account of what I call American national security
presiprudence.41 Presiprudence—the legal work product of the presidents of

34. Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 305.
36. Id. at 308.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 308.
40. Id. at 309.
41. Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security Presiprudence, 26 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 439 (2008), reprinted in TOP TEN GLOBAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW ARTICLES 55 (Amos N.
Guiora ed., 2009) [hereinafter Blomquist, Presiprudence].
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the United States—is a concept I formulated based on the Presidential Oath
Clause in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution42 that prescribes a unique
oath to be taken by the presidents-to-be before assuming the executive power
of the national government and which contemplates a special responsibility of
American presidents to articulate, safeguard, and watch over the American
national interest.43 My premise in an earlier article was “that, in the spirit of
existing scholarly fields of endeavor which attempt to systematize and critique
the coherence and robustness of the judiciary’s legal work product
(jurisprudence) and the legislature’s legal work product (legisprudence),” it is
appropriate to begin to develop related attention to the legal work product of
the president (presiprudence).44
American national security presiprudence, therefore, is a type of
systematizing device, described by Summers’ form and function legal theory,45
that constitutionally instantiates the president as the American national security
sentinel based on a broad—but not unlimited—interpretation of presidential
power. 46 This broad interpretation—giving rise to the logic of the presidential
American maximum security state, in appropriate circumstances—derives
from the intellectual roots of the American Presidency (those antecedents in
political philosophy and legal history, the lessons of ancient history and of
Colonial and Revolutionary experience) that demonstrate that the Founders
fashioned that unique institution with the contextual logos that presidents have
expansive powers to pursue the American national interest.47 Moreover, this
broad interpretation of presidential national security power flows from the
preponderance and prestige of strong executive advocates among the Founders
coupled with the historical precedents of strong and powerful presidential

42. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 7.
43. Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, The American National Interest and a Call
for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1, 51 (2004), cited in McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Blomquist, Presidential Oath].
44. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 440; Blomquist, Presidential Oath, supra
note 43, at 52 (“The Presidential oath is properly understood as the constitutional keystone of the
American Republic: it commands the President of the United States to preserve, protect and
defend—as well as articulate, pursue and achieve—the legal embodiment of the American
national interest. A new field of inquiry, which I have coined presiprudence, may help scholars
elaborate theoretical insights on the President’s pursuit of the legal national interest.”). Cf.
Richard M. Pious, Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative Politics, 37
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 66, 74 (2007) (“The relationship between the oath of office (requiring
that the president to execute the office, and preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, but not
mentioning execution of the law) and the clause that requires the president to ‘take care that the
laws be faithfully executed’ leaves open the possibility that a president, in fulfilling his oath, may
decide that specific laws need not or cannot be executed, especially in emergency situations.”).
45. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text.
46. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 441.
47. Id. at 441–48.
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actions to preserve, protect, and defend the Nation from the time of George
Washington to modern-era presidents.48 New geopolitical realities during the
first decade of the Twenty-First Century (the September 11th attacks and
subsequent terrorist attacks around the globe) add force to the necessity and
justification of our presidents to engage in careful “articulating, planning, and
managing an array of law and policy measures to protect the American
homeland, including surveilling and interdicting those who seek to harm
American national security, broadly defined.”49
B.

Three Overarching Philosophical Problems of Judicial Review of
American National Security Presiprudence

In approaching the question of judicial review of American national
security law and policymaking by the presidents of the United States (what I
call American national security presiprudence), the judiciary must resolve
three overarching philosophical problems.50 First, the problem of knowledge
(developed within the fields of epistemology and metaphysics) raises issues of
the judiciary’s access to global intelligence on threats facing the United States;
the judiciary’s baseline knowledge of past, present, and future security
concerns; the experience of judges in understanding, imagining, intuiting, and
reasoning about American national security; and the judiciary’s skill in
making, assessing, and second-guessing probabilistic evidence and pattern
recognition dealing with both concrete and abstract national security matters
such as intelligence functions (collection, analysis and dissemination, covert
action, counterintelligence and liaison) and homeland security regimes (nuclear
nonproliferation, maritime security, public health, and other matters).

48. Id. at 448–57. This is not to say, however, that presidents have preclusive power to
wage war in the face of contrary congressional statutes—the so-called “lowest ebb” of the
president’s authority as Commander in Chief. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). See David J. Barron & Martin S. Ledermann, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 691 (2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Ledermann,
The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941
(2008).
49. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 457. Of course, presidential national
security actions will be subject to potential checking legislation by Congress. Id. at 481. Still,
the president could “openly declare his constitutional objection to . . . congressional
micromanaging of national security,” or, in a less confrontational strategy, “work around certain
congressional restrictions by administrative finesse and creative interpretation” like use of
“necessary and proper constructions of the legislation, enabling the president and designated
administrative agencies to fulfill the duties expressly required by the legislation according to the
norms of administrative efficiency.” Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. I am indebted to Daniel Robinson for suggesting this philosophical framework. DANIEL
N. ROBINSON, THE GREAT IDEAS OF PHILOSOPHY 1 (2d ed. 2004).
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Second, the problem of conduct (the domain of ethics and moral
philosophy) implicates the need for judges to probe the consequences of their
review of sensitive national security determinations by the presidents and their
advisers—consequences to the litigants, consequences to the efficacy and
efficiency of the national security process of the Nation, consequences to the
coherence and integrity of the rule of law, and consequences to the foreign
relations of the United States.
Finally, the problem of governance (expanded by political theory, political
science, public policy, and systematic legal analysis) triggers questions of
conflict—between human and civil rights, government officials, branches of
government (executive, legislative, and judicial), and competing legal
principles—and questions of hierarchy among types of government (federal,
state, local, multi-national, and international).
C. Potential Aesthetics and Legal Arguments of American National Security
Law
In attempting to delve into concrete cases involving American national
security law, judges can gain clarifying insight in deciding upon their proper
role by considering four key aesthetics of national security law and five
potential types of national security legal arguments that lawyers could
conceivably fashion.
1. Aesthetics of American National Security Law
Professor Pierre Schlag offered an incisive comment in his 2002 landmark
article, The Aesthetics of American Law: “Law is an aesthetic enterprise.
Before the ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can be articulated, let
alone realized, the aesthetics of law have already shaped the medium within
which those projects will have to do their work.”51 Schlag convincingly
moved beyond what he characterized as “a conventional understanding of
aesthetics as the province of beauty and fine art” to his articulation of a
“description of those recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and
identity of the law.”52
While Professor Schlag’s project has a widespread illuminating power to
clarify many areas of American law,53 his general four-part aesthetic of
American law is robustly apt for unpacking national security law. First, there
is a grid aesthetic:

51. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2002).
52. Id. at 1050–51.
53. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Re-Enchanting Torts, 56 S.C. L. REV. 481, 490–505
(2002) (applying Schlagian aesthetics to American tort law).
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[The grid is a] two-dimensional area divided into contiguous well-bounded
legal spaces. These spaces are divided into doctrines, rules, and the like.
Those doctrines, rules, and the like, are further divided into elements, and so
on and so forth. The subjects, doctrines, elements, and the like are cast as
“object-forms.”
They exhibit the characteristic features of objects:
boundedness, fixity, and substantiality. They have insides and outsides that are
separated by well-marked boundaries. The resulting structure—the grid—feels
solid, sound, determinate. Law is etched in stone. The grid aesthetic is the
aesthetic of bright-line rules, absolutist approaches and categorical
54
definitions.

Modern American national security law has four key axes: the U.S.
Constitution, congressional enactments providing a statutory gloss and
interpretation of the Constitution, presidential decision-making processes that
invoke national security, and key judicial decisions by the Supreme Court.55
Interspersed along these four axes are an assortment of specific subjects,
doctrines, and elements. Enumerated constitutional powers (and limitations)
involve: federal governmental powers found in the Preamble,56 congressional
powers in Article I,57 presidential powers in Article II,58 the federal judiciary’s

54. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1051.
55. Some might argue that a fifth axis of modern American security law is the Charter of the
United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) in particular provisions
of the U.N. Charter dealing with the Security Council, U.N. Charter arts. 23–32; the provisions
dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes, id. arts. 33–38; the provisions addressing action
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, id. arts. 39–51;
and the provisions dealing with regional arrangements for maintenance of international peace and
security, id. arts. 52–54.
See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 147–55 (2005) (asserting the paramount
importance of the United Nations Security Council). I contend, however, that the best way to
conceive of the U.N. Charter and the Security Council is not in terms of the grid aesthetic of
clear-cut rules and categorical definitions, see supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text, but in
terms of two other, less fixed and determinate, aesthetics—the perspectivist aesthetic and the
dissociative aesthetic, see infra notes 93–127 and accompanying text.
56. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, . . . insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
57. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (uniform naturalization power); id. cl. 10 (power “[t]o define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations”); id. cl. 11 (power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. cl. 12 (power “[t]o raise and support
Armies”); id. cl. 13 (power “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy”); id. cl. 14 (power “[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); id. cl. 15 (power “[t]o
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions”); id. cl. 16 (power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the
Militia . . . and the Authority of training the Militia”); id. cl. 17 (power over the District of
Columbia and “to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
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Article III powers over cases or controversies,59 the federal Supremacy Clause
in Article VI,60 the non-delegated police powers of the States in the Tenth
Amendment,61 and the individual liberties fleshed out in the Bill of Rights and
subsequent amendments.62 The axis of congressional enactments that provide
a statutory gloss and interpretation of the Constitution’s national security
provisions includes: the War Powers Resolution,63 the National Security Act of
1947, as amended,64 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA),65 the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of

Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings”); id. cl. 18 (power “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department
or Officer thereof”).
58. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America”); id. cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation: ‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
Office of the President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States’”); id. § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
states . . . .”); id. cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties . . . .”); id. § 3 (“[He] shall . . . take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,
and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States”).
59. Id. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party . . . .).
60. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
61. Id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
62. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and to petition the
government); id. amend. II (right to bear arms); id. amend. III (no quartering of troops in any
house with limited exceptions); id. amend. IV (right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures and warrant requirements); id. amend. V (due process required for deprivation of life,
liberty or property, eminent domain limitations); id. amend. VI (right to speedy and public
criminal trial, right of confrontation, right of compulsory process, right of assistance of counsel);
id. amend. VIII (no excessive fines or bail, no cruel or unusual punishment to be inflicted by
government); id. amend. IX (other rights contemplated).
63. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541–1548).
64. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (2006)).
65. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518–2519 and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811).
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2001,66 the Military Commissions Act of 2006,67 and other enactments. The
axis of presidential decision-making processes that invoke national security
includes: presidential directives regarding bioterrorism,68 presidential
counterintelligence directives,69 presidential directives regarding homeland
security,70 intelligence law presidential directives,71 rules of engagement for
military force and delegated subordinate military orders issued by the
president,72 Memoranda of Notification (MONs) for the use of covert action,73
and presidential national security directives.74 Finally, the axis of key Supreme
Court decisions addressing national security includes the following essential
corpus: the twenty-first century decision in Boumediene v. Bush,75 the
twentieth century decisions in Navy v. Eagan,76 Dames & Moore v. Regan,77
United States v. Snepp,78 United States v. Nixon,79 Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,80 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp.,81 United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.,82 The Paquette
Habana,83 and the nineteenth century decisions in Totten v. United States84 and
The Prize Cases.85
Second, there exists the energy aesthetic of American law: “law is cast in
the image of energy. Conflicting forces of principle, policy, values, and
politics collide and combine in sundry ways.”86 Here, “[p]recedents expand or
contract in accordance with the push and pull of policy and principle. Legal

66. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
67. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) (declared partially unconstitutional).
68. JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS
TIMES 285–86 (2007).
69. Id. at 147.
70. Id. at 250.
71. Id. at 127, 129–30, 134–35.
72. Id. at 225–30.
73. Id. at 153.
74. BAKER, supra note 68, at 105–10.
75. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
76. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
77. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
78. Sneep v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
79. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
80. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
81. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
83. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
84. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
85. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
86. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1051.
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rules, principles, policies, and values have magnitudes that must be quantified,
measured and compared. Movement and flux are the orders of the day.”87
Modern American national security law is characterized by constantly
shifting forces of policy, values, and principles that coalesce and recombine in
many ways. Among these energy aesthetics are legal and policy dynamics of
four key forces involving “immediate and potentially catastrophic threats”88 to
the United States: (1) “the threat of terrorist attack using a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD)”;89 (2) national over-reaction by “measures that degrade
the quality of our democracy”;90 (3) the pressure to make convenient
compromises that “fail to fully protect against a WMD attack or to preserve
those values that underpin both our security and our liberty” because “we may
not agree as a society on the nature of the [security] threat and therefore the
nature of the response”;91 and (4) assorted resource, organizational, political,
and strategic costs “because we are distracted or divided, or . . . exhausted
from guarding against the threat of the next terrorist attack on the American
homeland or coping with foreign wars” to degrade our ability to address the
century’s other certain threats such as “nuclear proliferation, instability in the
Middle East, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, and energy and
economic rivalry.”92
Third, there is a perspectivist aesthetic of American law whereby:
The identities of law and laws mutate in relation to point of view. As the
frame, context, perspective, or position of the actor or observer shifts, both fact
and law come to have different identities. Accordingly, the social or political
identity of the legal actor or observer becomes the crucial situs of law and legal
93
inquiry.

87. Id. at 1051–52.
88. BAKER, supra note 68, at 1.
89. Id. A WMD might entail any one or combination of the following: “a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear device.” Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. In the evolving world of existential terrorist threats, the United States must also
contemplate low-technology attacks like the mass gunmen attacks on civilians in Mumbai India
during November 2008, and the murderous rampage by gun at Fort Hood, Texas in November
2009. See Gunman Kills 12, Wounds 31 at Fort Hood, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33678801/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/gunman-kills-woundsfort-hood/. And, of course, there was the Christmas 2009 “underwear bomber” plot. See Tim
Starks, Making Them Talk, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 11, 2010, at 102–08 (discussing Christmas
bombing plot of December 2009 in the wider context of American national security). Most
recently, the failed “Times Square Terror” car bomb attack by a U.S. citizen is of concern. See
Yochi Dreazen & Evan Perez, Suspect Cites Radical Imam’s Writings, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2010,
at A6.
92. BAKER, supra note 68, at 1.
93. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1052 (emphasis added).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

458

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX:439

Twenty-first century American national security law is subject to a
multitude of different—and frequently conflicting—points of view. By way of
some limited illustrations, public international lawyers and United Nations
devotees see the need for the primacy of the United Nations Charter, the
Security Council, collective security, and norms of treaty and customary
international law;94 members of the United States Congress tend to look at the
federal legislature as the national fiduciary in matters of war and peace, with
the president as a mere executive branch official (who happens to live in a
fancy mansion and have access to a big jet and a powerful helicopter) whose
national security responsibilities are authorized and controlled by Congress;95
and American military soldiers, sailors, marines, and air force members are
fixated on the constitutional chain of command (from the President, as
Commander-in-Chief at the top, down to the Secretary of Defense, the relevant
Combatant Commander to the hierarchical functional commanders of the
ground element and support element of United States forces).96 The president
has his or her own unique and lonely perspective of American national security
law—from the presidential oath of office and other constitutional powers in
Article II97 to the formal and informal processes of the National Security
Council (NSC);98 from the input of executive department secretaries of State,
Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and
the president’s military advisers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Situation
Room staff99 and close White House advisers like the Vice President100 and the
Chief of Staff.
Finally, the dissociative aesthetic is disorienting and confusing when:
[I]dentities collapse into each other. Nothing is what it is, but is always
something else. Any attempt to refer to X is frustrated, as even the most
minimal inquiry reveals that X is an unstable glomming-on of many other

94. See generally BAKER, supra note 68, at 192–225 (discussing international law treaties
and principles involving resort to force, and methods and means of warfare).
95. See generally id. at 176–92 (discussing constitutional powers of Congress over war and
national security, history of presidential use of force with and without congressional
authorization, and the enactment of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 requiring presidents to
consult, report and resolve military engagements according to congressional guidelines).
96. See generally id. at 225–39 (discussing the American constitutional military chain of
command, the nine unified combatant commands and an appraisal of the military chain of
command structure).
97. See generally Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 441–82 (explanation of
relevance is encouraged).
98. See generally BAKER, supra note 68, at 105–19 (discussing the formal framework of the
NSC, the National Security Council staff, and informal and ad hoc NSC processes).
99. See generally id. at 127, 142, 225–30 (discussing various executive departments’ inputs
to the president on national security issues).
100. See generally id. at 119–21 (discussing the various roles played by recent vice-presidents
in advising presidents on national security issues).
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things that cannot be subsumed or stabilized within any one thing. The crucial
contributions of the prior aesthetics—the grid (and its fixed identities), energy
(and its quantifiable magnitudes), and perspective[ist] (and its identifiable
relations)—have all collapsed. No determinable identities, relations, or
101
perspectives survive.

In the realm of American national security law, the Supreme Court’s
fractured opinions in Boumediene v. Bush102 (reflecting the collapse of
coherent legal discourse) are Exhibit A for the dissociative aesthetic. The
holding of the Court was simple: foreign detainees at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base in Cuba “have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus,” and
this privilege cannot be withdrawn “except in conformance with the
Suspension Clause.”103 Concluding that the procedures provided in the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)104 were not “an adequate and effective
substitute for habeas corpus,”105 the majority held that the jurisdictioneliminating subsection of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)106
unconstitutionally suspended the ancient writ.107
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy engaged in extensive historical analysis in
an attempt to shed light on the original understanding of the English writ of
habeas corpus at the time the U.S. Constitution went into effect in the late
eighteenth century. While Kennedy cited old, pre-1789 English cases for the
unobjectionable purpose of construing the Founders’ intent in crafting the
Suspension Clause,108 he also cited post-1789 English cases that were of
questionable relevance in the Court’s original understanding exercise.109 With
the exception of a mild and oblique rebuke by Justice Scalia,110 none of the
nine Justices saw the Court’s opinion as controversial, no doubt because the
English case citations were not being cited as foreign precedent, but rather to
uncover the historic evolution of habeas corpus during English history so that
the meaning of habeas corpus in the collective minds of the American
Founders might be discerned.111 But in several other respects, the Justices in
their respective majority opinion, concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions

101. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1052.
102. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
103. Id. at 732.
104. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. 10, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified in
part at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006) (Detainee Policies)).
105. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732, 733.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
107. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732, 733.
108. See, e.g., id. at 746.
109. See, e.g., id. at 753–54.
110. Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion’s analysis of British
caselaw).
111. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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seemed to be talking past one another. A few examples will suffice to show
the disassociation among the Justices. One aspect of collapse—or legal
meltdown—is Justice Souter’s assertions, in his concurring opinion, that the
“Court’s exercise of responsibility to preserve habeas corpus [involves]
something much more significant . . . than pulling and hauling between the
judicial and political branches”112 and that “today’s decision is no judicial
victory, but an act of perseverance in trying to make habeas review, and the
obligation of the courts to provide it, mean something of value both to
prisoners and to the Nation.”113
A second example of the play of the dissociative aesthetic in Boumediene
is Chief Justice Roberts’ broadside attack on the majority opinion with
scorching comments like: “[t]he Court rejects [‘the most generous set of
procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy
combatants’] . . . out of hand, without bothering to say what due process rights
detainee possess, without explaining how the statute fails to vindicate those
rights, and before a single petitioner has even attempted to avail himself of the
law’s operation”;114 the Court’s decision [is] “an awkward business”;115 “[t]he
majority’s overreaching . . . is egregious”;116 and “[i]f the Court can design a
better system for communicating to detainees the substance of . . . classified
information relevant to their cases, without fatally compromising national
security interests and sources, the majority should come forward with it,” but
“[i]nstead, the majority fobs that vexing question off on district courts to
answer down the road.”117
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Boumediene provides a third
instantiation of disassociation on the Supreme Court over national security
law.118 Scalia’s dissent, indeed, strongly epitomizes what Professor Schlag has
described as “the sensation” of the dissociative aesthetic in American law “of
conceptual quicksand, of distinctions that dissipate—a kind of virtual
jurisprudential reality in which identities morph into each other” when
compared to the Boumediene majority.119
Consider the following Scalian romp through what must feel like the
conceptual quicksand of the majority’s opinion: (1) “The writ of habeas corpus
does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad; the Suspension Clause
thus has no application, and the Court’s intervention in this military matter is
112. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 800 (Souter, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. Id. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito.
115. Id. at 808.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 825–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by the
Chief Justice and by Justices Thomas and Alito.
119. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1097 (emphasis added).
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entirely ultra vires”;120 (2) “America is at war with radical Islamists,” and they
have “threatened further attacks against our homeland; one need only walk
about buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a plane anywhere in the
country, to know that the threat is a serious one”;121 (3) “[t]he game of baitand-switch that today’s opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief
will make the war harder on us” and “[i]t will almost certainly cause more
Americans to be killed”;122 (4) it is “incredibl[y] difficult[ ] [to] assess[ ] who
is and who is not an enemy combatant in a foreign theater of operations where
the environment does not lend itself to rigorous evidence collection,” but
“[a]stoundingly, the Court today raises the bar, requiring military officials to
appear before civilian courts and defend their decisions under procedural and
evidentiary rules that go beyond what Congress has specified”;123 (5) “What
competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of Congress
and the President . . . ? None whatsoever. But the Court blunders in
nonetheless,” and “[h]enceforth, as today’s opinion makes unnervingly clear,
how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch
that knows the least about the national security concerns that the subject
entails,”;124 (6) “[t]he fundamental separation-of-powers principles that the
Constitution embodies are to be derived not from some judicially imagined
matrix, but from the sum total of the individual separation-of-powers
provisions that the Constitution sets forth”;125 (7) “Manipulation of the
territorial reach of the writ [of habeas corpus] by the judiciary poses just as
much a threat to the proper separation of powers as manipulation by the
Executive,” and “manipulation is afoot here”;126 and (8) the summary of his
dissent at the culmination of his opinion:
Today the Court warps our Constitution in a way that goes beyond the
narrow issue of the reach of the Suspension Clause, invoking judicially brainstormed separation-of-powers principles to establish a manipulable
“functional” test for extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus . . . . It blatantly
misdescribes important precedents, most conspicuously Justice Jackson’s
opinion for the Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager. It breaks a chain of precedent
as old as the common law that prohibits judicial inquiry into detentions of
aliens abroad absent statutory authorization. And, most tragically, it sets up
our military commanders the impossible task of proving to a civilian court,
under whatever standards this Court devises in the future, that evidence
supports the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 832 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today. I dissent.

2. Five Types of National Security Legal Arguments
The four aesthetics of national security law that I have discussed—the grid
aesthetic, the energy aesthetic, the perspectivist aesthetic, and the dissociative
aesthetic—relate to, and interact in interesting ways with, what Professor
Wilson Huhn calls The Five Types of Legal Arguments.128
According to Huhn: “Legal arguments may be based upon text, intent,
precedent, tradition, or policy analysis.”129 In overarching terms, he explains
that “[t]he five types of legal arguments represent different conceptions of
what law is.”130 Thus:
Law may be considered to be a legal text itself. It may be regarded as what the
text meant to the people who enacted it into law. Law may be conceived as the
holdings or opinions of courts setting forth what law is. It may be thought of
as the traditional ways in which members of the community have conducted
themselves. Finally, law may be understood as the expression of the
underlying values and interests that the law is meant to serve. The five types
131
of legal argument arise from these different sources of law.

Professor Huhn provides more specificity to the five types of legal
argument in ways that can be helpful in unpacking the theoretical normative
form and function of American national security law. First, as he points out,
“[t]he primary source of law in our [American] society is legal text.”132
Legal text includes the Constitution of the United States and the state
constitutions, federal and state statutes, municipal ordinances, administrative
regulations, and any other public writings that have the force of law. The term
“legal text” also includes privately written documents such as contracts, wills,
deeds, checks, and promissory notes. Although these private documents are

127. Id. at 849. The disassociative aesthetic also exists when “global legalists,” in Eric
Posner’s words, speak past the realities of self-interested nation-states in matters of war and
peace. See ERIC POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 36–37 (2009) (the U.N. charter is
viewed by global legalists as encompassing jus cogens norms that “supersede all other
international law, and that states may not opt out of or change these norms” but “[t]he problem
with this view is that states, including leading states,” and others violate these norms on occasion,
such as the “military intervention in Kosovo by NATO forces in 1999” that “violated the U.N.
charter and was clearly illegal,” leading many international lawyers to engage in the doublespeak
that the war was “illegal but legitimate”).
128. WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13 (2d ed. 2008).
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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not law in and of themselves, they are legal texts because they create or alter
133
legal rights.

Second, another type of legal argument and “source of law is the intent of
the people who wrote the text. This principle is applicable to every area of the
law, but it is called by different names in each area.”134 Thus, there is an intent
behind constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, and wills of testators.135
“Evidence of intent may be drawn from the text of the law itself, from previous
versions of the text, from its drafting history, from official comments, or from
contemporary commentary.”136
A third type of legal argument and source of law is precedent of judicial
“decisions of higher courts within the same jurisdiction and appl[ication] [of]
the doctrine of stare decisis to previous decisions of the same [authoritative]
court.”137 Moreover, the aforementioned controlling, or binding, precedent is
to be distinguished from merely persuasive authority that typically is a function
of “the location, level, and reputation of the court issuing the [non-binding]
decision.”138
A fourth type of legal argument and source of law is tradition. As
Professor Huhn opines, “[t]radition often exerts a silent influence on legal
reasoning. Our traditions establish ‘baselines,’ which are background
assumptions that favor the status quo and place the burden of proof on any
person who seeks to change the existing order.”139 And, “[s]imilar to baselines
are ‘cognitive schemas,’ which are unexamined and often unspoken
assumptions about human potential that purport to explain existing social
relationships.”140
Fifth, a final type of legal argument and source of law is policy. As
explained by Huhn, legal arguments based on policy analysis are different in
fundamental ways from arguments based on text, intent, precedent, and
tradition.141
The distinctive feature of policy arguments is that they are consquentialist in
nature. The other four types of arguments are appeals to authority, but the core
of a policy argument is that a certain interpretation of the law will bring about
a certain state of affairs, and this state of affairs is either acceptable or
unacceptable, in the eyes of the law. Deriving rules of law from text, intent,
precedent and tradition is inherently conventional; such rules represent specific
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 17.
HUHN, supra note 128, at 31 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
HUHN, supra note 128, at 49−50 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 51.
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choices that our lawgivers have already made. Deriving rules from policy
arguments, on the other hand, is inherently open-ended; the specific choice has
not yet been made. Text, intent, precedent and tradition look principally to the
142
past for guidance; policy arguments look to the future for confirmation.

In the realm of American national security law, Professor Huhn’s five
essential legal arguments—of text, intent, precedent, tradition, and policy—
involve interesting permutations. Textual language of the U.S. Constitution
focuses national security powers on the president through a number of
expansive, but ambiguous, provisions. Congress, too, is given textual
constitutional powers that can—if the powers are actually exercised—check a
president’s national security actions. Occasionally Congress finds it politically
expedient to pass statutory restrictions on presidential national security
discretion. Presidents tend to rhetorically resist these statutory textual limits,
on one level, but try to placate Congress as much as possible, on other levels.
In the realm of American national security law and policy, the key legal
arguments involve a constitutionally sanctioned “invitation to struggle [over
the text of the Constitution] for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy,”143 to protect the nation from hostile existential threats, and to preserve
the homeland against catastrophic attack.
The intent of the Founders strongly suggests that when they invented the
unique institution of the American Presidency, they fully expected the
president to be the national security sentinel who would be counted on to take
the lead in planning for and implementing the armed defense of the nation.
First, “the intellectual roots of the American presidency—those antecedents in
legal history and political philosophy, the lessons of history, and the lessons of
Colonial and Revolutionary experience— . . . indicate, that, the Founders
fashioned the institution with the contextual expectation and goal for
Presidents to have expansive powers to pursue American national security.”144
Second, the predominant number and gravitas of Founders favored a strong

142. Id.
143. CORWIN, supra note 1, at 171.
144. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 441–42. This contextual intent of the
Founders consists of their familiarity and support for the great commentators of English law and
English constitutional custom of extensive “kingly command” to conduct foreign relations, make
war or peace and to suppress insurrections; the Founders’ support for political theory of a strong
executive to sometimes push the limits of the law in order to preserve the nation; historical
lessons regarding the importance of robust executive powers, flexibly administered, to preserve
public order and public liberty; and the Colonial and Revolutionary experience of frustration with
a multiplicity of executives in the Continental Congress and state governments trying—often at
cross-purposes—to win the war against Great Britain and, subsequently, to govern after
independence had been achieved. Id. at 442–48.
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executive to respond to and deal with unknown national exigencies and
emergencies.145
Tradition is the customary exercise of “unspecified but real powers,”
exercised by American presidents from George Washington onward, pursuant
to the “positive grant” of the vesting of all executive power in the
president146—to “preserve, protect and defend,” according to the Presidential
Oath Clause,147 the constitutional sovereignty of the United States. It is a
powerful national security law argument for expansive presidential power,
subject to limited checking by Congress through clear statutory restrictions.148
Justice Felix Frankfurter identified the importance of tradition in gauging the
scope of presidential national security powers. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, he stated:
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant
the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or
supply them.
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to
149
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.

Precedents for interpreting American national security policy are derived
from three principal bodies of law: the handful of key U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on the constitutional nature of executive and congressional powers to
protect the nation;150 the corpus of presidential security directives, memoranda
and rules of engagement;151 and the compilation of congressional enactments
on national security affairs in the United States Code.152 While judicial
precedents are well known and recognized, it is important to recognize and
understand the importance of what Professor Michael J. Gerhardt calls
“nonjudicial precedent,”153 exemplified by congressional and presidential
actions and non-actions in the face of national security crises.
Finally, policy arguments about the potential consequences of institutional
competence and authority, effective deterrence and interdiction of enemies
foreign and domestic, as well as national safety and well-being are critical in
the realm of national security legal interpretation. Indeed, the new geopolitical
145. Id. at 448–51.
146. FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 220
(1994); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
147. Blomquist, Presidential Oath, supra note 43, at 52; see supra notes 43–44 and
accompanying text.
148. See Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 451–57.
149. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
150. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
153. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 111 (2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

466

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX:439

realities facing the United States in the aftermath of September 11th and the
global jihad instigated and organized by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups
and affiliated rogue nation states illustrate the importance of fortifying and
enhancing the American national security legal system to better anticipate and
manage these threats in the future.154
III. THE PROBLEM WITH AMERICAN JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON FOREIGN JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY ADJUDICATION
It is unwise for United States Supreme Court Justices to cite transnational
judicial precedent—opinions in cases decided by national or sub-national
courts other than the United States, international tribunals like the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), or the European Court of Human Rights—in any matter
before the Supreme Court involving American national security. National
Security law cases that come to the Supreme Court will deal expressly, or by
implication, with a matrix of decisions by the presidents of the United States.
These presidential decisions will involve core Article II presiprudential
national security determinations155 that may be augmented or limited by core
Article I congressional powers over war, military provision, and regulation of
foreign affairs.156 Supreme Court Justices can resolve national security
problems of knowledge157 by reading background books, articles, and
government documents.158 Judicial resolution of the separate national security
problems of conduct159 and problems of governance160 should be prudentially
limited to American sources of law—the U.S. Constitution, federal statutory
law, presidential decision orders, and past U.S. Supreme Court precedent.161
Our Justices should seek, as much as practicable, to make judicial rulings and
supporting judicial opinions by privileging the president’s perspective on
national security needs carefully balanced by Congress’ perspective162 as
revealed by clearly-stated, specific textual statutory enactments.163 In difficult
cases of apparent national security conflict between the President and
Congress, the Court should rely on past Supreme Court cases164 that interpret
the grid aesthetic165 with the energy aesthetic.166 The most relevant Supreme
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 467–75.
See supra notes 41–49, 58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See Blomquist, Jurisprudence, supra note 13.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 55–85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Court precedent in this regard is and will remain the various opinions in the
Youngstown case.167
Four specific functional reasons168 militate in favor of Supreme Court
reliance on exclusively American law and precedent in national security
disputes and against citation of foreign judicial precedent as persuasive
authority in cases and controversies dealing with American national security:
(a) ethos and American identity, (b) effective dispute resolution, (c)
meaningful agenda-setting and constitutional dialogue, and (d) judicial
political legitimacy.
A.

Ethos and American Identity

The ethos of American national security law is predicated on the unique,
vast, and disproportionate financial and human burden endured by the
American people over the last century in responding to aggressive wars by
other nations and terrorist acts by non-state and state actors.169 Moreover,
American constitutional systemic form and function establishes the President
of the United States as the national security sentinel with great discretion in
deciding how to preserve, protect, and defend the American nation.170 Also,
our Supreme Court Justices cannot forget that, unlike other national
constitutions (e.g. Germany and South Africa) that expressly invite the
reception of international and comparative law in domestic courts, the
American constitutional tradition is much more conservative in allowing the
use of foreign law.171 Thus, the national security policy established by the
President and Congress on behalf of the American people is distinctive and
arguably sui generis in the world given the context of great burdens carried by
the United States in the name of global security over the last century.
The “whole American fabric,” identified by Chief Justice John Marshall in
support of the Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison172 and the related

166. See Schlag, supra note 51, at 1051.1051−52.
167. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
168. My analysis at this juncture relies upon GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 147–76 (chapter
5, entitled, The Multiple Functions of Precedent).
169. See, e.g., SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
848–87, 987–1045, 1065–73 (1965) (American role in World War I, World War II, and Korean
war); JAMES T. PATTERSON, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974, at 510–
13, 593–636 (1996) (Vietnam War); JAMES T. PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED
STATES, FROM WATERGATE TO BUSH V. GORE 230–38 (2005) (Gulf War I).
170. See supra notes 33–49 and accompanying text.
171. See Jan M. Smits, Comparative Law and Its Influence on National Legal Systems, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 514–30 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006).
172. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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national ethos argument by Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,173 invoking
the American “Constitution intended to endure for ages to come,”174 parallel
the nationally distinctive constitutional imperative to acknowledge the
distinctive national security authority of the President, as balanced by
Congress, in making and applying national security law. Such a unique
American national security apparatus is part of our nation’s collective identity
and must, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “be considered
in light of our whole experience . . . “175 as a nation for over two centuries in
enduring various wars, emergencies, and threats.
It is a red herring argument for proponents of judicial cosmopolitanism to
contend that citations of foreign judicial decisions are not in the nature of
binding precedent but, merely, persuasive precedent.176 Indeed, persuasive
precedent—especially when cited and blessed by United States Supreme Court
judicial opinions—can take on the functional gravitas of binding precedent.
By way of a useful analogy, Michael Dorf explained the “functional notion of
precedent” in the context of disputing the formalist doctrine that civil law
jurisdictions—in Europe and elsewhere—do not recognize precedent.
According to Professor Dorf, other scholars have joined his view that the “civil
law jurisdictions do have a doctrine of precedent.”177 Moreover:
The proliferation in recent years of trans-European and other international
courts that publish their judgments accompanied by lengthy opinions in the
“American” style—and that adjudicate cases for both common law and civil
law countries—only further erodes the notion that high-profile adjudication
178
can proceed without a functional notion of precedent.

173. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
174. Id. at 415.
175. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (involving the Court’s interpretation of
the federal government’s treaty-making power versus state power regarding the international
issue of migratory bird conservation).
176. See, e.g., Justice Kennedy’s conclusion in Roper v. Simmons “that foreign experience
merely confirmed the conclusions he and his colleagues would have otherwise reached
independently . . . .” Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 103, 169 n.188 (2008). In Justice Kennedy’s own words: “The opinion of the world
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation of our own conclusions.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
177. Dorf, supra note 176, at 159, 159 n.162 (citing MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 36–38 (1986) (“While formally free to disregard legal opinions
of their superiors, [civil law] judges continued to look to high courts for guidance.”); PETER
GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD & TECHNIQUES
39 (1986) (“The status of jurisprudence as law is informally recognized in that reference to
previous decisions containing interpretations of the law is made during the course of legal
argument [in civil law courts], and may be found in notes and commentaries made about the
code.”)).
178. Dorf, supra note 176, at 159.
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Thus, applying Dorf’s pragmatic insight to the potential citation of foreign
judicial decisions by U.S. Supreme Court Justices as persuasive precedent in
American national security cases, these so-called non-binding precedents have
the significant potential of morphing into functionally binding American
precedents notwithstanding the different ethos of foreign national security
precedent. This development would be profoundly unwise given that
“[p]recedents are integral to the nation’s understanding of itself and how the
[American] public and public authorities conceive the nation,”179 and
American national security Supreme Court precedents are, like other core
American precedents in areas such as civil rights and equal protection,
“essential elements of our distinctive national identity.”180 In a related way,
Supreme Court national security precedents are important symbols181 of the
American constitutional ethos of “a common defense.”182
B.

Effective Dispute Resolution

To resolve disputes that come before the Supreme Court, it is advisable for
the Justices “to proceed, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested . . . from the
‘bottom up’ by which he means incrementally, one case at a time, and on the
According to Michael J. Gerhardt’s
narrowest grounds possible.”183
penetrating analysis of “bottom up” judging in The Power of Precedent, this
approach to dispute resolution “means that the Court ought to decide particular
cases based on what it can learn from other actors and experience,” so that
“[b]y deciding cases from the bottom up, the Court leaves more room for the
other branches [the Executive and the Congress] to operate and positions itself
to learn from its and other constitutional actors’ experiences.”184
Citation of transnational judicial precedent in national security cases by
Supreme Court Justices would constitute a troublesome variation of top-down
judging. In the process of such citation, Supreme Court Justices would be
“impos[ing] on lower courts or other authorities principles directly inferred
from the Constitution,”185 utilizing foreign judicial precedent as a
“reassurance” that the Supreme Court was in the mainstream of other
prestigious foreign courts in discerning normative principles of national
security governance that regulate how far the executive can go in protecting
the nation and how much oversight and checking authority the national
legislature should enjoy over national security affairs. But top-down judging

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 171.
Id.
See id. at 169–70 (discussing the symbolism functional purpose of precedent).
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 151.
Id.
Id.
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in this fashion allows the Supreme Court “no margin of error” since “the Court
has to get it right from the start or risk having its error perpetuated and spread
through the enforcement of its decisions.”186 Moreover, the risk of error is
exacerbated by a misguided citation of foreign judicial precedent that may
have been taken out of the context of the foreign legal system where the
precedent originated.
By withholding citation to foreign judicial precedent in American national
security disputes as well as restraining itself from directly inferring broad
principles from the Constitution, “the Court minimizes the risks of error, so it
can avoid overreaching its competence, not unduly interfere with other
branches’ constitutional decision-making [over national security issues], and
learn from its own mistakes and the mistakes of other institutions.”187 Indeed,
“[a]mong the things [the Court] will learn over time,” by engaging in bottomup judging in national security cases, “is how much, or little, it should explain
the reasons for its decisions.”188 One suspects that the political costs of citing
foreign judicial precedent in American national security disputes—and over
theorizing transnational norms of executive and legislative power discretion—
would always outweigh whatever minor benefits exist in advancing the cause
of judicial cosmopolitanism.
C. Meaningful Agenda-Setting and Constitutional Dialogue
Since 2004, the Supreme Court has sent “important signals to litigants,
lower courts, and other public authorities”189 that have invited litigation against
presidential and congressional legal arrangements to address the “war on
terror,” otherwise known as radical Islamic insurgencies against the United
States in Iraq and Afghanistan. By accepting certiorari petitions and ruling
against the President and Congress in a line of decisions—including Rasul v.
Bush,190 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,191 and Boumediene v. Bush192—the Court has
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 154.
190. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas statute extends
to aliens at Guantanamo), superseded by statute, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
191. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (holding that a military commission set
up to try an accused al Qaeda conspirator violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Geneva Conventions), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
192. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 791 (2008) (holding that foreign detainees at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba “have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus” and
that such a privilege cannot be withdrawn “except in conformance with the Suspension Clause”
and finding that the review procedures outlined in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, supra
note 104, were not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus and that the jurisdiction-stripping
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established precedent that will invite further litigation that seeks to challenge
American national security presiprudence. Moreover, the line of cases that
commenced in 2004 has been vague and vigorously contested, resulting in
splintered Court opinions. Indeed, Boumediene “adopted an uncertain and
malleable test” and “the Court’s holding leave many questions unanswered and
could allow an administration that is determined to keep detainees beyond the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts to use other avenues of accomplishing its ultimate
goal.”193
In light of the wrenching changes in American national security that have
transpired since September 11th, it is salutary that the Court has used a line of
precedent to set a judicial agenda for constitutionally scrutinizing novel
national security legislation and presidential policy making. Thus far, the
Court’s agenda-setting on habeas corpus and national security has led to and
facilitated a constitutional dialogue about the meaning of prior U.S. Supreme
Court holdings that have interpreted constitutional text.194 The RasulHamdan-Boumediene line of precedent has framed, informed, and guided a
constitutional dialogue among American judges, lawyers, presidents, members
of Congress, academics, military officers, and the public at large. This
dialogue has pragmatically focused on American sources of law. As Robert
Post has argued, “constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical
relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates
[American] culture.”195 It would be antithetical to the ongoing national
conversation about American national security presiprudence in the post
September 11th era, in general, and counterproductive to the national
conversation on habeas corpus and national security, in particular, to have
Justices cite foreign judicial precedents. The American national security
constitutional culture is wrapped up in and defined by the American
experience, American values, and American interests. It would be incendiary
for a U.S. Supreme Court Justice to cite a foreign judicial precedent in the
provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006),
unconstitutionally suspended the writ).
193. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases: Extraterritorial Reach of Writ of Habeas Corpus,
122 HARV. L. REV. 395, 396 (2008).
194. In particular, Boumediene involved a contest of meaning regarding Johnson v.
Eisentrager, in which the Supreme Court held that German war criminals confined in a U.S.administered prison in Germany were not entitled to habeas. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 790 (1950). Based on the Boumediene majority’s review of Eisentrager and its other
extraterritoriality opinions, the Court found three factors relevant in determining the Suspension
Clause’s reach: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which the status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension
and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s
entitlement to the writ.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
195. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).
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ongoing post-September 11th national debate on national security and the
Constitution.
D. Judicial Political Legitimacy
A final functional reason for urging Supreme Court Justices to avoid
citation of foreign judicial precedents in reviewing American national security
presiprudence is for the Court to maintain its political legitimacy. Indeed,
political legitimacy for the Court is very fragile and vulnerable in the realm of
constitutional review of national security policy. First, Supreme Court
decisions depend on the “social acquiescence” of the American people and
particular elites within American society.196 The Court has suffered a strong
backlash from its Boumediene v. Bush decision from an editorial in a national
newspaper197 to the reaction of a presidential candidate.198 How much stronger
would the backlash have been if the Boumediene Court had cited a foreign
judicial precedent in support of its holding?
Second, “a precedent,” in order to achieve and maintain political
legitimacy, “has to receive the genuine, enduring commitment of political
institutions” to the principles articulated in the Supreme Court opinion.199
Foreign judicial precedents that are incorporated by reference in Supreme
Court national security opinions risk alienating significant numbers of
members of Congress, the President, and the American military.
Third, the political legitimacy of a Supreme Court opinion also depends on
sound persuasion. The Supreme Court opinion needs “to be grounded in
sufficiently persuasive reasoning, argumentation, rhetoric, or imagery as to
cultivate, maintain, and win the longstanding support of at least the Court and
the leadership of other [American] public institutions.”200 Citation of a foreign
judicial precedent by a Supreme Court Justice in an American national security
presiprudence case is likely to be a “shot from the hip” with little, if any,
rhetorical salience to the meaning and protection of American national
security.
CONCLUSION
The form and function of the American national security system posits an
invitation to struggle between the President and Congress, with the Supreme

196. GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 153.
197. See, e.g., Editorial, President Kennedy, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2008, at A14 (“We can say
with confident horror that more Americans are likely to die as a result.”).
198. Senator John McCain called Boumediene “one of the worst decisions in the history of
this country.” The Supreme Court-Leading Cases: Extraterritorial Reach of Writ of Habeas
Corpus, supra note 193, at 395 n.10 (citation omitted).
199. GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 153.
200. Id.
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Court as constitutional arbiter. The Supreme Court, in turn, faces problems of
knowledge, conduct, and governance whenever the Court engages in judicial
review of national security cases. The aesthetics of American national security
law, while reticulated by a grid of textual constitutional provisions, statutory
enactments, presidential directives, and Court precedent, is predominantly
shaped by the energy of the push and pull between (and often within) the three
branches of the federal government and the differing perspectives of
government officials within American government. On occasion, when
extraordinarily important national security issues call out for resolution,
government officials dissociate from robust interchange and engagement with
one another and end up talking past one another.
American sources of law and policy are appropriate for conceptualizing
and analyzing problems of American national security. It would be unwise for
our Supreme Court to cite foreign judicial precedent to resolve American
national security problems for the fourfold reasons: (1) that ethos and
American identity is implicated by American national security cases; (2) that
effective national security dispute resolution should not utilize a top-down
judicial resolution by the Court’s looking to foreign precedent to reassure itself
that its inference of broad constitutional principles are correct; (3) that
meaningful agenda-setting and constitutional dialogue concerning American
national security law in the post-September 11th era is best achieved by
prudent, respectful, and diligent exchange of American-derived legal
arguments from the wide panoply of American national security texts,
precedents, traditions, and policies; and (4) that the imperative of the Supreme
Court to maintain political legitimacy is particularly important in the national
security arena where the Constitution has assigned a predominant role to
presidents to develop American national security presiprudence and to
Congress to act as a junior partner in this existential enterprise.
All of this is not to suggest that the Supreme Court should foreclose good,
potential ideas from transnational experience and theory that address twentyfirst century national security problems. But the Court should eschew citation
of transnational precedent.
When considering the power and fit of
transnational national security ideas, the Court should mention the books,
articles, papers, statutes, case opinions, and the like as bearing on diverse
policy perspectives, not persuasive precedent.201

201. Cf. VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA
(2010) (arguing for cautious engagement by the Supreme Court with transnational sources of law
in interpreting the American Constitution).
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